More Thoughts on Justice (Book II)

As we began to examine Thrasymachus's idea of justice, we deduced that if justice is, in fact, the advantage of the stronger, then people benefit those in power to avoid punishment. In other words, people are solely just to avoid punishment. From a cynical standpoint, I can't disagree, but I do feel that Plato is striving for a more hopeful definition where justice is a motivation rather than a threat.

It was here that we discussed the concept of justice as an ideology - a facade for moral structure - that emphasizes the idea of justice as the advantage of the stronger. I immediately grew agitated at this concept and attempted to make sense of this definition; if it is true, my cynicism goes unchallenged, but I needed, still, to assume Plato had better intentions.

I deduced: Justice as an ideology is a halfway point to the intention of being just. Some are content with being just as it will benefit those in power and save them from punishment, but [I assume] Plato seeks to further define justice so it will benefit the person.

It is in this that justice moves from an ideology (threat) to a virtue (motivation). Ultimately, I hold fast that, being aware of this, people would choose to be just because it makes them a better person, an exemplary human being. (Here, exemplary ought not be taken lightly; to be exemplary should be the most basic ingredient toward human motivation. After all, we are all inherently models of humanity.) And in this, I found hope, as I often strive to find in philosophy, even if the hope I found is just a matter of my selective reasoning.

Didn't this piss anyone else off?